

INCUMBENCY, ISSUES, AND SPLIT TICKET VOTING

Abstract

Political scientists usually conceptualize ticket splitting as driven by short term forces in down-ballot races. This paper examines the degree to which split-ticket voting is in fact motivated by factors such as legislative candidate incumbency — and to what degree it is also motivated by policy issues in play for top-of-ticket races. The analysis utilizes a unique set of data: a quarter-million 1994 Los Angeles County ballot images, which provide a look at actual patterns of voting up and down individual punch cards in a wide variety of districts. I analyze the nature and degree of gubernatorial/state legislative ticket splitting across various types of districts and among voters on opposing sides of the election's "defining issue" (Proposition 187). I confirm previous research showing incumbency is a significant factor in ticket splitting: when a voter is faced with an assembly incumbent not matching the party of his choice for governor, the probability of defection in the assembly contest doubles. However, I also find that the issues in play at the top of the ticket are also a significant driver of ticket splitting: among those backing Democrats for the assembly, Proposition 187 supporters were much more likely to defect to Wilson (a vocal 187 supporter) than were Proposition 187 opponents. Weaker partisans and voters who were cross-pressured were even more likely to split their ballots than others. The results are consistent with an issue ownership theory of ticket splitting and divided government.

CHRISTOPHER C. BLUNT

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA — LOS ANGELES

4289 BUNCHE HALL • LOS ANGELES, CA 90024

CCBLUNT@UCLA.EDU

Prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park August 31 - September 3, 2000. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.

A flurry of recent and not-so-recent research has examined the motivations of voters who support candidates of different parties for executive and legislative offices. Most political science research has conceptualized split-ticket voting as driven mainly by short term forces at work in down-ballot races. Such forces can include incumbency, partisan strength, candidate quality, and amount of money spent (Burden and Kimball, 1998; Jacobson, 1997; Beck et al, 1992; Petrocik and Doherty, 1996).

V.O. Key (1956, pp. 201-202) speculated that split ticket voting may result from individual down-ballot office-seekers establishing a personal identity independent of the larger ticket. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the behavior of down-ballot candidates really does impact ticket splitting. As Jacobson (1997) demonstrates, well-funded and experienced candidates are highly skilled at drawing votes from across the political spectrum — including those who had supported a different party at the top of the ticket. Some of the strongest such evidence is provided by Burden and Kimball (1998). Based on aggregate election results in different congressional districts, they use ecological inference techniques to estimate the probable degree of ticket splitting in various areas of the country. They find that split tickets are significantly more common in districts with strong incumbents and larger amounts of money spent on the congressional race. In other words, many of those who supported George Bush at the top of the ticket were then drawn away from the GOP by incumbent Democratic congressmen who widely outspent their opponents.

It is less common for political scientists to frame ticket splitting as driven by short term forces at work at the *top* of the ticket or from various levels simultaneously. Some of the earliest studies (Campbell and Miller, 1957; Campbell et al., 1960) suggested that the personal appeal of Dwight Eisenhower was responsible for leading otherwise solid Democrats to vote Republican for President (but these early studies also emphasized institutional factors, such as ballot forms which permit party block voting, as especially important). It is quite possible, however, that the low-information nature of most legislative races makes legislative voting the “default” or personality-driven choice, with the “action” in ticket splitting resulting from high levels of information in gubernatorial or presidential contests.

Petrocik (1991) argues that issues featured at the top of the ballot can and do play a powerful role in drawing voters away from a party supported further down the ballot. For example, a voter may learn through news coverage that the President has signed a host of laws with which he agrees — but never learn how his own congressman voted on any of those bills. Such a voter may revert to name familiarity, partisanship, or memories of constituent service in choosing a congressional candidate, but act on what he has learned about the presidential candidates’ substantive issue positions when voting at the top of the ticket. When the dominant presidential issues are Republican but Democrats dominate in congressional race incumbency and spending, voters will be drawn to vote Republican at the top of the ticket but Democratic at the bottom. In this way, Petrocik contends, issue ownership is largely responsible for divided government (and, implicitly, the split-ticket voting which produces divided government).

Petrocik's work in question (1991) was focused mainly on the larger question of divided government and what contributes to producing it. Although he did not conduct a micro-analytic study of ticket splitting among individual voters, his aggregate data make a compelling case that issue ownership at the top of the ticket and incumbency at the bottom of the ticket can combine to powerfully divide partisan loyalties among individuals.

Few investigations of ticket splitting have sought to weigh the comparative effects of legislative-driven ticket splitting versus executive-driven ticket splitting. Indeed, apart from Petrocik, few have even framed ticket splitting as driven by both forces simultaneously. The usual approach has been to frame ticket splitting as a matter of down-ballot defection from a choice made at the top of the ballot, and quantify the degree of such influence. As Burden and Kimball put it, "Since the presidential contest usually appears at the top of the ballot and is the more visible race, we assume that voters make their presidential choice first. Voters then have three options in the congressional races that appear farther down the ballot..."

This frame does give one important conceptualization of split-ticket balloting, and my paper will provide evidence that legislative-driven factors do lead to split tickets. The paper then weights the strength of such factors against the degree of "gubernatorial driven" ticket splitting in the same election. The analysis will focus on the relative degree to which gubernatorial-driven *versus* legislative-driven short term forces at work in that year's general election led voters to divide their ballots, and the types of voters most vulnerable to each kind of short term force. The paper ultimately validates Petrocik's theory of ticket splitting and quantifies the degree to which voters are influenced by each type of force.

Most previous studies have examined Presidential-Congressional ticket splitting, and most have relied on sample surveys for their data. Such races are the most visible, have the most survey data available, and have therefore drawn the most interest. Ideally, we would want to investigate ticket splitting at the individual level and compare individuals across districts, but the small number of survey cases for any given congressional district (or even for any given state, for Senate races) is usually quite small. In addition, surveys rely on respondent self-reports, which may have inaccuracies (especially for down-ballot races). Burden and Kimball avoid this problem by using ecological inference techniques to analyze aggregate-level data from a wide range of congressional districts, but even this technique does not provide a precise picture of the actual choices of individual voters in different districts. This paper uses an even more unusual, and precise, set of data: the actual voting punch cards used by nearly a quarter of a million Los Angeles County voters in 1994. These data allow an investigation of ticket splitting using thousands of actual "tickets" from a wide variety of state legislative and U.S. congressional districts.

I confirm that legislative incumbency was a substantial driver of defection in 1994; among those siding with the Republican gubernatorial candidate, for example, those living in Democratic-incumbent assembly or congressional districts were much more likely to defect to the Democratic party than those with a Republican incumbent on the ballot (and vice versa). *However, I also find that short term forces at work in the gubernatorial race were no less important (and were sometimes even*

more important) drivers of defection. Among those siding with the Democrat for state assembly or U.S. Congress, those agreeing with the Republican candidate on the gubernatorial election's defining issue (Proposition 187) were much more likely to defect to the Republican gubernatorial candidate than were those agreeing with the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Those cross-pressured (i.e. Proposition 187 supporters living in a Democratic district) were most likely of all to split their ballots. As Petrocik would predict, Proposition 187, which featured a Republican-owned issue (immigration), inspired party defection which mainly benefited Republican Governor Pete Wilson.

Not surprisingly, voters with less of a partisan attachment (based on their vote patterns for other offices) were much more likely to be influenced by both gubernatorial-driven and legislative-driven forces. Strong partisans were relatively immune from these short term forces.

It should be noted that another school of thought contends that voters consciously choose candidates of different parties to fill different offices as an end in itself. According to this "balancing" hypothesis, voters are motivated by a desire for divided government, either to keep the parties in check or to produce a more moderate set of policy outcomes (Ingberman and Villani, 1993; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1996; Smith et al., 1999; Mebane, 2000). Fiorina (1996), for example, argues that some voters desire divided government and use ticket splitting as a means of enacting it. Ideological moderates, in particular, believe that by entrusting different institutions to the control of different parties, a more balanced or moderate outcome will result. The parties will be better able to keep each other in check, and extreme liberal or conservative policies will be avoided. Smith et al. (1999) find considerable evidence that voters consciously acted in such a manner in the 1996 congressional elections. Furthermore, Mebane (2000) uses a stochastic choice model, based on individual-level NES data, to show that voters have engaged in such "balancing" to a substantial degree between 1976 and 1996.

The ballots provide only an indirect test of the "balancing" hypothesis. I find that the same short term forces associated with ticket splitting in gubernatorial-assembly voting were also found acting, with nearly identical strength, when investigating splits between gubernatorial and congressional candidates. Given that the same short term forces seem to exert the same degree of influence both when voters *could* conceivably be "choosing divided government" and when they *could not possibly* be doing so, this seems to point up the importance of short term forces as opposed to a conscious desire for divided government *per se*.

Data and Methodology


I compiled electronic images of all 249,461 ballots cast in 868 Los Angeles County precincts for the 1994 general election. These precincts constitute a geographically and demographically representative sample of the County's 6,109 total precincts. They are drawn from throughout the County, with at least some ballots for even the most obscure local races. More importantly, the racial composition of the sample precincts almost perfectly parallels that of the entire County. As the appendix details, both the sample precincts and the County as a whole have a racial breakdown that is roughly half non-Latino white, one-third Latino, ten percent Asian, and ten percent black. Furthermore, had the 1994 election been held only in these precincts, outcomes for all partisan races and ballot initiatives would have been within a few percentage points of the overall County results.

The ballots themselves are a tremendous resource, and truly allow an academic researcher to "look over the shoulder" of hundreds of thousands of voters. Accessing these ballots is quite difficult, however. The County stores ballot images in an obscure COBOL-based column binary format on round-reel magnetic tapes. After translating the punch card images into ASCII (a formidable task), the researcher has 312 variables (one for each of the punch positions on the voter's card) for each of the 249,461 cases.¹ If a given position was punched, it is recorded as "1". Unpunched positions are shown as "0." (An additional variable identifies the precinct in which the ballot was cast.)

From the 312 individual punch positions, new variables can be constructed representing all the races on the ballot. For example, the first five punch positions in 1994 corresponded to the gubernatorial race; based on which of the holes was punched, voters were assigned a code of 1 (Wilson, Republican), 2 (Brown, Democrat), 3 (Rider, Libertarian), 4 (LaRiva, Peace & Freedom), or 5 (McCready, American Independent) for the gubernatorial vote variable. If no box was punched, the voter is coded as having abstained; if two or more boxes were punched, the voter is coded as "invalid" for that race. This process was then repeated for all of the dozens of races on the ballot.² From these new variables, it is possible to determine voter patterns across all eleven partisan office contests³ and all the ballot measures.

From these office votes, I constructed two measures of ticket splitting. The first centers on consistency between gubernatorial and state assembly votes; voters were classified as Solid Republican (Pete Wilson for Governor and Republican for the assembly), Solid Democrat (Kathleen Brown for Governor and Democrat for the assembly), Wilson Splitters (Wilson for Governor and Democrat for assembly), Brown Splitters (Brown for Governor and Republican for assembly), and other (abstentions, minor party votes). The second measure of ticket splitting is built in the same way, but substitutes U.S. Congress vote for State Assembly vote. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the county-wide distributions of these two measures are nearly identical. In gubernatorial/assembly voting, the percentage of Wilson Splitters ranges from a low of 5.3 percent (AD 60) to a high of 20.1 percent (AD 39); the percentage of Brown splitters ranges from 1.9 percent (AD 53) to a high of 8 percent (AD 61). In congressional voting, Wilson Splitters range from 4.7 percent (CD 28) to 15.9 percent (CD 36); Brown Splitters range from 2.1 percent (CD 29) to 8.3 percent (CD 38). In both cases, this is a fairly substantial degree of variation among districts.

In the analysis, I will sometime refer to these groups by the names above (e.g. “Brown Splitters”), but will more often use the letters “R” and “D” as shorthand labels. For example, Solid Republicans will be denoted RR, and Brown splitters will be labeled DR.



Although a pure measure of party identification is not available in these ballots, it is possible to make inferences about voters' partisanship based on their choices in other contests. For the eight partisan contests apart from governor, assembly, and U.S. Congress (the three races I will be using in later analysis), I counted the number of Republicans each person supported and the number of Democrats each person backed. I then subtracted the number of Democrats from the number of Republicans. This yields a left-right scale ranging from -8 (straight Democrat) to +8 (straight Republican). One-fifth (20.1 percent) cast a straight Democratic ballot; slightly fewer (17.1 percent) cast a straight Republican ballot. The average voter scored -.75 on this scale, meaning that he supported almost one more Democrat on balance than he supported Republicans. For analysis purposes, I will collapse this scale into five categories: Strong Republicans (+7,+8), Weak Republicans (+6 to +2), Mixed (+1, 0, -1), Weak Democrats (-2 to -6), and Strong Democrats (-7,-8).

Tests and Hypotheses

The relatively low information in legislative races provides an advantage to incumbents. When little information about the candidates is available, voters will act on what little they do know --- and an incumbent is more likely to be familiar to voters than a challenger. Incumbents have not only had their names in front of the electorate before, but they have also had the opportunity to do considerable constituent service. As a result, assembly districts with incumbents should inspire more ticket splitting than open seat districts. For example, a voter who supports the Democrat for governor should be more likely to vote Republican for the assembly, *ceteris paribus*, when there is an incumbent Republican seeking reelection than when the incumbent is a Democrat (or the seat is open). There should be more Wilson Splitters in Democrat-incumbent assembly districts than elsewhere, and more Brown Splitters in Republican-incumbent districts.

Weaker partisans should be more "susceptible" to the pressures of short term forces than stronger partisans. For example, weak Republicans in Democrat-incumbent districts should be much more likely to be Wilson Splitters than their counterparts in Republican-incumbent districts; the increased probability of being a Wilson Splitter should be only miniscule for stronger Republicans. Likewise, weak Democrats in Republican-incumbent districts should be much more likely to be Brown Splitters than weak Democrats in Democratic districts; this increased probability should be much smaller for stronger Democrats.

Those who are loyal to a particular party at the legislative level, but defect at the Gubernatorial level, are likely doing so because of the highly-visible policy issues associated with the gubernatorial race. Because of the degree of information available for various offices, issue-driven or performance-driven defection is much more likely to occur at the gubernatorial than the legislative level. Both gubernatorial candidates are typically well-known and voters able to form an opinion about both. In 1994, for example, by late October one of the most respected California public polls showed 95 percent of voters were able to form an opinion⁴ of Pete Wilson; 88 percent could form an opinion⁵ of Kathleen Brown (Field, 1994).

In 1994, Proposition 187 was arguably the single issue most strongly associated with the gubernatorial race. This ballot measure, which passed by a comfortable margin, sought to deny public services to illegal immigrants (much of it was later ruled unconstitutional). Governor Wilson was a strong supporter of Proposition 187, and made immigration reform a central issue of his 1994 campaign. Kathleen Brown, by contrast, strongly opposed the measure. It became, in many respects, one of the defining issues of the gubernatorial contest and was widely credited as a key factor in Wilson's reelection. As such, it should have had the power to drive a substantial degree of ticket splitting. And as a Republican-owned issue, the direction of Proposition 187-inspired ticket splitting should have mainly benefited Pete Wilson. This makes the 1994 California general election in many respects an ideal testing-ground for Petrocik's theory. A person who voted Democratic in the low-information assembly contest, but who supported Proposition 187, should have been much more likely to defect to the gubernatorial candidate who shared his views (Pete Wilson) than would a Democratic assembly voter who opposed Proposition 187. Such patterns should be especially pronounced among weaker partisans.

An examination of voting behavior with various combinations of cross-pressures will give a sense of which short term forces (legislative incumbency or Proposition 187) were most responsible for ticket splitting in 1994. Naturally, ticket splitting should be greatest when voters are cross-pressured (i.e. Proposition 187 supporters who live in a Democrat-incumbent district). The next step of analysis would be to hold one condition constant and examine the degree of ticket splitting as the other condition changes. For example, keeping Proposition 187 support constant, how much more RD voting is there in Democrat-incumbent districts than open seat districts or Republican-incumbent districts? Keeping assembly incumbency constant, how much more RD voting is there among Proposition 187 supporters than opponents? This will give a sense of the relative importance of the short term forces at work in the gubernatorial versus legislative races in leading voters to split their tickets. Finally, I will build logistic regression models to predict the probability of splitting tickets in various directions; this will yield a more precise estimate of the relative importance of each type of short term force.

The ballots provide an indirect test of the "balancing" thesis. I will replicate the gubernatorial/assembly analysis (above) for gubernatorial/*congressional* ballot patterns and compare the results. In the former case, voters could conceivably be "choosing" divided government. In the latter, they could not possibly be doing so. What my analysis essentially does is hold constant the other drivers of ticket splitting (issues and incumbency) and change only "the ability to choose divided government." If forces such as incumbency and gubernatorial issues are substantially *more* important drivers of gubernatorial/congressional splitting than gubernatorial/assembly splitting, it would be reasonable to conclude that some other short term force might be acting to mute the impact of incumbency and issues as drivers of gubernatorial/assembly splits. This force might be something excluded from the previous analysis (such as campaign spending), but it might also be a desire to divide state government between Republicans and Democrats. If, on the other hand, the influences over gubernatorial/assembly ticket splitting patterns appear in

very similar strength for gubernatorial/congressional ticket splitting patterns, I would conclude that short term forces such as incumbency and gubernatorial policy issues are probably more important a driver of ticket splitting generally than is “balancing” *per se*.

It should be acknowledged, up front, that these data do not provide an ideal test of the relative importance of short term forces in gubernatorial races and legislative races generally. The ballots are drawn from only one election, in one county, and measure only one short term force at each level of office. In most elections, a whole host of short term forces confront voters at both office levels: campaign spending, incumbent performance, the state of the economy, scandals, other public policy issues, and so forth. If it was possible to capture and compare some of these other forces, the results might be different. *The paper’s chief contribution is that it examines actual ballots, finds a way to examine at least some short term forces at work at both levels, and quantifies the relative impact of those forces examined.*

Incumbency and Legislative-Driven Ticket splitting

Table 1 confirms the substantial impact of legislative incumbency on ticket splitting⁶. In short, districts with incumbents inspire more ticket splitting than open seats. There were significantly more RD voters in districts with Democratic incumbents than in open districts or Republican-incumbent districts (which, as expected, had the fewest RDs). In the eleven Democratic-incumbent districts, 13.1 percent of voters were RD; this figure dropped to 8.7 percent in the six open districts and 7.2 percent in the six districts with Republican incumbents. Likewise, there were significantly more DR voters in districts with Republican incumbents (5.7 percent) than in open seat districts (3.2 percent) or Democrat-incumbent (3.2 percent) districts.

Table 1: Type and Degree of Ticket Splitting by 1994 L.A. County Assembly District							
Incumbency							
	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Dists	N of Votes
State Assembly	34.1	34.6	10.3	3.9	17.1	23	232,747
R-Incumbent	46.3	24.3	7.2	5.7	16.5	6	64,346
D-Incumbent	28.8	37.6	13.1	3.2	17.3	11	103,656
Open Seat	30.6	40.0	8.7	3.2	17.4	6	64,747

Not surprisingly, weaker partisans are more susceptible to these short term forces than are stronger partisans. Among weak Democrats, 12.1 percent of those in Republican-incumbent districts were DR --- compared to just 4.5 percent of those in Democrat-incumbent districts. This is an increase of 7.6 percent. Among strong Democrats, by contrast, the impact is only 3 percent (from 1.2 percent to 4.2 percent). The same is true of Republicans. Among weak Republicans, the likelihood of voting RD is 10.7 percent higher in Democrat-incumbent districts (17.9 percent) than in Republican-incumbent districts (7.2 percent). Among strong Republicans, the increased likelihood of voting RD in Democrat-incumbent districts is minimal (2.7 percent, or 4.2 percent compared to 1.5 percent in Republican-incumbent districts).

	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Votes
Total	34.1	34.6	10.3	3.9	17.1	232,747
R-Incumbent (Total)	46.3	24.3	7.2	5.7	16.5	64,346
Strong GOP	93.7	.1	1.5	.9	3.8	17,486
Weak GOP	69.3	1.3	7.2	5.2	17.0	13,493
Mixed	24.1	8.1	9.0	8.0	50.8	8,398
Weak Dem.	13.7	39.2	14.3	12.1	20.7	13,870
Strong Dem.	1.0	84.3	5.7	4.2	4.8	11,099
D-Incumbent (Total)	28.8	37.6	13.1	3.2	17.3	103,656
Strong GOP	90.6	.2	4.2	1.2	3.8	18,966
Weak GOP	55.0	3.5	17.9	4.9	18.7	16,848
Mixed	13.2	14.4	17.1	5.0	50.3	14,897
Weak Dem.	5.1	50.4	20.6	4.5	19.4	27,058
Strong Dem.	.3	87.1	6.4	1.2	5.0	25,887
Open Seat (Total)	30.6	40.0	8.7	3.2	17.4	64,747
Strong GOP	94.1	.1	1.6	.9	3.2	11,348
Weak GOP	66.9	2.4	8.7	4.7	17.3	9,557
Mixed	17.8	11.0	10.9	5.2	55.1	7,859
Weak Dem.	7.3	48.5	16.4	5.1	22.6	17,671
Strong Dem.	.3	88.7	4.9	1.1	5.0	18,312

Short Term Forces and Gubernatorial-Driven Ticket Splitting

The top of the ticket usually showcases a higher information contest than the down-ballot races, so issue-driven or performance-driven defection would be more likely to happen at the top of the ticket than at the legislative level. Voters should connect their public policy preferences with the gubernatorial candidate who shares those policy preferences, regardless of which party the voter supported for state assembly.

Table 3 confirms that Proposition 187 seemed to drive a fair degree of ticket splitting in the high-information 1994 gubernatorial race. Among those supporting Proposition 187, nearly 14 percent were RD voters; this is compared to 6 percent among the measure's opponents and 6.4 percent among the few with no opinion on it. Similarly, DR voting was much higher among Proposition 187 opponents (5.5 percent) than among the measure's supporters (2.8 percent) or those with no opinion (2.3 percent).

	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Votes
State Assembly						
Yes-187	52.1	16.4	13.8	2.8	15.0	125,674
No-187	12.6	59.2	6.0	5.5	16.6	97,913
Abstain-187	18.0	21.1	6.4	2.2	52.3	9,162

Again, it appears that those with weaker partisan attachments are the most susceptible to election-specific short term forces. Among weak Republicans, disagreeing with Pete Wilson on Proposition 187 increases the likelihood of voting DR from 2.8 percent to 11.9 percent. Strong Republicans, by contrast, were more willing to overlook their disagreements with Wilson; those opposing Proposition 187 were only 4.1 percent more likely to vote DR than those who supported it. A similar pattern held on the Democratic side. Weaker Democrats were most likely to be drawn to Wilson by their support for Proposition 187; those supporting it were 22.1 percent more likely to be RD than those opposing it. Although among strong Democrats this impact was somewhat weaker (12.9 percent) than for weak Democrats, *12.9 percent is much larger than the 4.1 percent impact on DR voting evidenced among strong Republicans*. This gives substantial support to the conventional wisdom that Proposition 187 helped propel Pete Wilson to victory in 1994. This issue proved to be so powerful, it drove substantial defection to Wilson among strong Democrats and weak Democrats alike. This is also an example of how issue ownership can result in ticket splitting and, ultimately, divided government

Table 4: Type and Degree of 1994 L.A. County Assembly Ticket Splitting By Proposition 187 Vote						
	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Votes
Yes-187						
Strong GOP	93.9	.0	2.4	.5	3.1	40,787
Weak GOP	67.6	1.2	12.4	2.8	15.9	29,191
Mixed	24.4	7.3	19.0	4.5	44.8	16,322
Weak Dem.	13.7	30.1	30.9	5.7	19.6	23,714
Strong Dem.	1.1	76.0	14.9	2.2	5.8	15,660
No-187						
Strong GOP	84.7	.5	3.8	4.6	6.3	6,060
Weak GOP	50.1	6.6	11.9	11.9	19.5	9,338
Mixed	10.8	20.2	7.9	8.9	52.3	11,723
Weak Dem.	3.8	60.9	8.8	7.3	19.2	32,488
Strong Dem.	.2	91.9	2.0	1.6	4.3	38,304

Comparative Impact of Incumbency and Proposition 187

It appears that some short term forces at work in legislative districts draw voters to “defect” from the party chosen at the top of the ticket. It also appears that some short term forces at work at the top of the ticket draw voters to “defect” from the party chosen at the legislative level. It could be the case, however, that the heavy support for Proposition 187 in Republican districts has created a spurious relationship in these data. Tables 5a and 5b isolate the individual effects of each type of short term force, allowing a comparison of their relative strengths. These tables evaluate the strength of each force, holding the other constant. For example, holding constant Proposition 187 support (Table 5a), living in a Democratic district more than doubles the probability of casting a RD split ballot compared to living in a Republican district (from 8.6 percent to 18.2 percent). Likewise, holding constant Proposition 187 opposition, living in a Republican district more than doubles the probability of being a DR voter compared to living in a Democratic-incumbent district (from 4.6 percent to 9.5 percent).

Table 5A: Relative Influence of Incumbency and Proposition 187 Vote on 1994 L.A. County State Assembly Ticket Splitting						
	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Votes
Prop 187-Yes						
R-Incumbent	62.8	10.6	8.6	3.7	14.3	39,335
D-Incumbent	44.5	19.9	18.2	2.3	15.1	55,461
Open Seat	51.9	17.5	12.6	2.4	15.6	30,878
R-D Difference	18.3	-9.3	-9.6	1.4	-0.8	
Prop 187-No						
R-Incumbent	19.5	48.9	4.9	9.5	17.2	22,847
D-Incumbent	10.4	61.5	7.2	4.6	16.3	43,670
Open Seat	10.7	63.6	5.2	4.0	16.5	31,396
R-D Difference	9.1	-12.7	-2.2	4.9	0.9	

There is a similar magnitude of impact when controlling for district incumbency (Table 5b). Holding “living in a Democrat district” constant, being a Proposition 187 supporter more than doubles the probability of casting a RD split ballot, compared to being a Proposition 187 opponent (from 7.2 percent to 18.2 percent). Holding “living

Table 5B: Relative Influence of Incumbency and Proposition 187 Vote on 1994 L.A. County State Assembly Ticket Splitting						
	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Votes
Republican Incumbent						
Prop 187-Yes	62.8	10.6	8.6	3.7	14.3	39,335
Prop 187-No	19.5	48.9	4.9	9.5	17.2	22,847
Yes-No Difference	43.3	-38.3	3.7	-5.8	-2.9	
Democrat Incumbent						
Prop 187-Yes	44.5	19.9	18.2	2.3	15.1	55,461
Prop 187-No	10.4	61.5	7.2	4.6	16.3	43,670
Yes-No Difference	34.1	-41.6	11.1	-2.3	-1.2	
Open Seat						
Prop 187-Yes	51.9	17.5	12.6	2.4	15.6	30,878
Prop 187-No	10.7	63.6	5.2	4.0	16.5	31,396
Yes-No Difference	41.2	-46.1	7.4	-1.6	-0.9	

in a Republican district” constant, being a Proposition 187 opponent nearly triples the probability of casting a DR split ballot (from 3.7 percent to 9.4 percent).

It should be emphasized that voters subject to cross-pressures were the most likely to cast split ticket ballots. Among Proposition 187 supporters living in Democratic districts, more than 18 percent were Wilson Splitters. Likewise, Proposition 187 opponents living in Republican districts were most likely to be Brown Splitters (9.5 percent).

I built logistic regression models to predict the probability of splitting one’s ticket in each direction, holding other factors constant. The first model focuses on predicting Wilson Splitters; the dependent variable is coded 1 if the person cast a RD ballot and 0 if he did not. The three independent variables are partisan strength in non-gubernatorial, non-assembly, and non-congressional races (ranging from 0 to 8, perfectly muddled pattern to straight ticket voter); assembly district incumbency (coded 1 for Democrat and 0 for non-Democrat), and Proposition 187 vote (coded 1 for yes and 0 for non-support).

The second model predicts Brown Splitters; the dependent variable is coded 1 if the person cast a DR ballot and 0 if he did not. The three independent variables are partisan strength, assembly district incumbency (coded 1 for Republican and 0 for non-Republican), and Proposition 187 vote (coded 1 for no and 0 for non-opposition). As Table 6 details, all variables are significant in both models. In both cases, Proposition 187 is somewhat more important than assembly incumbency, but especially important when predicting Wilson Splitters.

Independent Variables	Wilson Splitters (RD)			Brown Splitters (DR)		
	Coef- ficient	Std Error	Probability Level	Coef- ficient	Std Error	Probability Level
Partisan Strength	-.177	.003	.0000	-.200	.004	.0000
Republican Incumbent District				.688	.022	.0000
Democrat Incumbent District	.558	.014	.0000			
Proposition 187 Supporter	.956	.015	.0000			
Proposition 187 Opponent				.857	.022	.0000
Constant	-2.196	.018	.0000	-2.937	.024	.0000
Overall Models:	Chi-Sq=10927, 3 df p<.0001 N=232,749 89.7% correctly classified			Chi-Sq=4860, 3 df p<.0001 N=232,749 96.1% correctly classified		
<p>Note: Coefficients are from the logistic regression procedure in SPSS.</p> <p>Dependent variable coded 1 if split ticket in given manner and 0 if did not. Ballots from the two uncontested Assembly districts are excluded from analysis.</p> <p>Partisan strength is measure of loyalty to a single party in all races except Governor, Assembly, and Congress. Partisan strength ranges from 0 (weakest) to 8 (strongest).</p>						

Logistic regression coefficients do not have absolute meaning. I therefore transformed these coefficients into actual probability estimates, holding other variables in the model constant. Table 7 details all of these probability estimates. For example, holding partisan strength and Proposition 187 support constant at their means, a person living in a Democrat incumbent district had a .11 probability of casting a RD ballot; the same person living in a non-Democrat district had less than a .07 probability of doing so. The overall effect of Democratic incumbency, therefore, is to increase the probability of RD voting by .045. Looking at the impact of Proposition 187, a person who supported the ballot measure (holding all else equal) had nearly a .13 probability of casting a RD ballot. A Proposition 187 opponent with the same characteristics had only a .05 probability of doing so. The net effect of Proposition 187 support, therefore, is to increase the probability of RD ticket splitting by more than .07. As drivers of RD voting in this election, short term forces in the gubernatorial race seem to have been more important than short term forces on the legislative side.

Table 7 Computed Impacts: 1994 L.A. County State Assembly Ticket Splitting			
Wilson Splitters (RD)		Brown Splitters (DR)	
Probability Given:		Probability Given:	
Democrat incumbent	.1123	Republican incumbent	.0495
Non-Democrat incumbent	.0675	Non-Republican incumbent	.0255
Proposition 187 Supporter	.1259	Proposition 187 Supporter	.0216
Proposition 187 Opponent	.0525	Proposition 187 Opponent	.0494
No partisan strength	.1930	No partisan strength	.0842
Strongest partisan	.0547	Strongest partisan	.0182
NET Impact of:		NET Impact of:	
Proposition 187 support	.0734	Proposition 187 opposition	.0278
Democrat incumbency	.0448	Republican incumbency	.0240
One partisan strength unit	-.0173	One partisan strength unit	-.0083

On the other side of the coin, Proposition 187 opposition is about as strong of a driver of DR voting as is Republican assembly incumbency. Both factors increase the probability of splitting one's ticket in this direction, but the two effects are about equal — and considerably weaker than in predicting RD ticket splitting.

Not surprisingly, partisan strength (or lack thereof) is much more strongly associated with both kinds of ticket splitting than either of the other two factors. This is to some extent axiomatic; people who are more loyal to a particular party in eight of eleven races will almost certainly be more loyal to that party in the other three races. I included partisan strength in these models primarily as a control, but it is interesting to examine the effect of it holding the other two factors constant. A person who votes a straight ticket in the other eight races has only a miniscule probability of voting either RD or DR — but both of these probabilities increase dramatically as partisan strength decreases.

Gubernatorial-Congressional Ticket splitting

The ballots allow only an indirect test of the “balancing” hypothesis, that voters deliberately split their choices as a means of enacting divided government. I have demonstrated a strong association between legislative incumbency, Proposition 187 support, and the propensity to split one’s ticket in the direction that an issue ownership or “short term forces” theory would predict. However, because the ballots do not include additional attitudinal measures, it is conceivable that these voters were actually motivated by a desire to divide the state government between the two parties. I will therefore turn my attention to a type of ticket splitting which could not possibly be motivated by a desire for divided government (except in the most indirect and abstract of ways): gubernatorial/congressional splits. I will replicate the gubernatorial/ assembly analysis (above) for gubernatorial/*congressional* ballot patterns and compare the results. In the former case, voters could conceivably be “choosing” divided government. In the latter, they could not possibly be doing so. What my analysis essentially does is hold constant the other drivers of ticket splitting (issues and incumbency) and change only “the ability to choose divided government.” If forces such as incumbency and gubernatorial issues are substantially *more* important drivers of gubernatorial/congressional splitting than gubernatorial/ assembly splitting, it would be reasonable to conclude that some other short term force (possibly the desire to choose divided government) may be acting to mute the impact of incumbency and issues as drivers of gubernatorial/assembly splits.

Incumbency and Congressional-Driven Ticket splitting

Table 8 confirms that congressional district incumbency exhibits as strong a relationship with split-ticket voting as does assembly district incumbency.⁷ In the six congressional districts with Republican incumbents, 6.6 percent of voters cast DR ballots --- nearly twice the level of DR balloting in the fifteen Democrat-incumbent districts (3.4 percent). Likewise, in the Democrat-incumbent districts, 12.9 percent cast a RD ballot --- substantially more than in the Republican-incumbent districts (7.8 percent). These incumbency-related increases in ticket splitting probability of 5.1 percent and 3.2 percent are almost identical to the incumbency-related increases of 6.0 percent and 2.5 percent found earlier in assembly voting. Had the effects of incumbency been substantially stronger in gubernatorial/congressional ticket splitting, it would be plausible that some other short term force, such as (but not limited to) a desire for divided government, was operating at the assembly level to mute the impact of incumbency. As it is, however, incumbency seems to be about as strong of an influence in both types of ticket splitting.

Table 8: Type and Degree of Ticket Splitting by 1994 L.A. County Congressional District Incumbency							
	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Dists	N of Votes
U.S. Congress	34.9	34.2	10.8	4.7	15.3	21	228,396
R-Incumbent	47.1	23.8	7.8	6.6	14.7	6	95,655
D-Incumbent	26.1	41.8	12.9	3.4	15.8	15	132,741

Again, as with the assembly analysis, weaker partisans are more susceptible to these short term forces than are stronger partisans. Among weak Democrats, 14 percent of those in Republican-incumbent congressional districts are DR --- compared to just 4.7 percent of those in Democrat-incumbent districts. This is an increase of 9.3 percent, very similar to the 7.6 percent increase among weak Democrats for gubernatorial/assembly ticket splitting. Among strong Democrats, the impact is only 4 percent (from 1.4 percent to 5.4 percent), again very similar to the 3 percent increase seen in gubernatorial/assembly balloting. The same is true of Republicans. Among weak Republicans, the likelihood of voting RD is 12.2 percent higher in Democrat-incumbent districts (20.5 percent) than in Republican-incumbent districts (8.3 percent). This is only slightly larger than the 10.7 percent evidenced in assembly balloting. Among strong Republicans, the increased likelihood of voting RD in Democrat-incumbent districts is even more minimal (2.5 percent) than it was for assembly balloting (2.7 percent). All told, it appears that weak partisans remain the most susceptible to these short term forces, and the impact for both Republicans and Democrats is quite similar to the impact for gubernatorial/assembly voting. These results, while not disproving the “balancing” thesis, do cast doubt on its plausibility. The same forces seem to be working with the same strength, on the same kinds of individuals, both when voters *could* be choosing divided government and when they *could not possibly be doing so*.

Table 9: Type and Degree of Ticket Splitting by Partisan Strength and Congressional District Incumbency						
	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Votes
Total	34.9	34.2	10.8	4.7	15.3	228,396
R-Incumbent	47.1	23.8	7.8	6.6	14.7	95,655
Strong GOP	93.5	.1	1.6	.9	3.9	26,221
Weak GOP	69.7	1.6	8.3	5.3	15.0	20,053
Mixed	25.8	7.9	10.6	9.5	46.2	12,800
Weak Dem.	14.7	39.3	15.1	14.0	17.0	20,769
Strong Dem.	1.1	83.6	5.9	5.4	4.0	15,812
D-Incumbent	26.1	41.8	12.9	3.4	15.8	132,741
Strong GOP	90.8	.2	4.1	1.1	3.9	21,361
Weak GOP	56.7	2.9	18.1	5.4	16.9	19,475
Mixed	13.6	14.8	17.8	6.0	47.8	17,710
Weak Dem.	4.6	53.2	20.5	4.7	16.9	36,495
Strong Dem.	.3	87.1	5.5	1.4	5.8	37,700

Gubernatorial-Driven Ticket Splitting: U.S. Congress

Proposition 187 seems to have exerted only slightly more influence over gubernatorial/congressional ticket splitting than gubernatorial/assembly splits. Among Proposition 187 supporters, 14.6 percent cast a RD gubernatorial/congressional ballot; this is 8.4 percent greater than for Proposition 187 opponents. In gubernatorial/assembly voting, 187 supporters were 7.8 percent more likely than opponents to cast a RD ticket. Similarly, on the congressional side, 7.2 percent of Proposition 187 opponents cast a DR ballot; this is 4.2 percent greater

than 187 supporters. On the assembly side, Proposition 187 opponents were 2.7 percent more likely than supporters to vote DR.

	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Votes
U.S. Congress						
Yes-187	52.6	16.3	14.6	3.0	13.5	124,035
No-187	13.4	58.7	6.2	7.2	14.5	95,485
Abstain-187	18.7	21.3	6.9	2.4	50.7	8,876

Looking at the impact by strength of partisanship, it is again clear that short term forces exert the greatest influence over weaker partisans — and the influence is nearly identical to what it is in gubernatorial/assembly voting. Among weak Democrats who supported Proposition 187, 32 percent voted Democrat for congress but defected to Pete Wilson in the gubernatorial race (RD). Among weak Democrats who *opposed* that measure (and therefore did not have the short term force acting upon them), only 9.2 percent cast such a ballot. This is a difference of 22.8 percent, which is much greater than among all voters — but nearly identical to the 22.1 percent impact on weak Democrats in gubernatorial/assembly voting.

Similarly, among weak Republicans, 13.3 percent of Proposition 187 opponents cast a DR gubernatorial/congressional ballot — compared to just 2.9 percent of weak Republicans who supported the measure. This works out to a total net influence of 10.4 percent, which is much greater than for all voters but very similar to the 9.1 percent total net influence it exerted on weak Republicans in gubernatorial/assembly voting.

	RR	DD	RD	DR	Else	N of Votes
Yes-187						
Strong GOP	93.4	.1	2.6	.5	3.4	40,613
Weak GOP	67.8	1.2	13.8	2.9	14.3	28,944
Mixed	25.9	7.6	20.9	5.0	40.6	16,096
Weak Dem.	14.1	31.4	32.0	6.4	16.1	23,311
Strong Dem.	1.3	75.1	14.8	2.7	6.2	15,071
No-187						
Strong GOP	85.6	.5	3.2	4.5	6.2	6,012
Weak GOP	52.1	5.5	12.0	13.3	17.0	9,247
Mixed	12.3	19.7	8.7	12.4	46.9	11,419
Weak Dem.	4.3	61.6	9.2	9.6	15.4	31,652
Strong Dem.	.2	90.9	1.9	2.5	4.4	37,155

Relative Influence of Incumbency and Proposition 187: Congressional Voting

I built logistic regression models to determine the relative impact of incumbency and Proposition 187 on gubernatorial/congressional ticket splitting. Again, the goal is to estimate the probability of splitting one's ticket in each direction, holding other factors constant. The first model focuses on predicting Wilson Splitters; the dependent variable is coded 1 if the person cast a RD ballot and 0 if he did not. As was the case earlier, the three independent variables are partisan strength, assembly district incumbency (coded 1 for Democrat and 0 for Republican), and Proposition 187 vote (coded 1 for yes and 0 for non-support).

The second model predicts Brown Splitters; as was the case on the assembly side, the dependent variable is coded 1 if the person cast a DR gubernatorial/congressional ballot and 0 if he did not. The three independent variables are partisan strength, assembly district incumbency (coded 1 for Democrat and 0 for Republican), and Proposition 187 vote (coded 1 for no and 0 for non-opposition). As Table 12 details, all variables are significant in both models. In both cases, as was true in assembly voting, Proposition 187 is somewhat more important than congressional incumbency — but especially important when predicting Wilson Splitters.

Independent Variables	Wilson Splitters (RD)			Brown Splitters (DR)		
	Coef- ficient	Std Error	Probability Level	Coef- ficient	Std Error	Probability Level
Partisan Strength	-.195	.002	.0000	-.202	.004	.0000
Democrat Incumbent District	.700	.015	.0000	-.800	.020	.0000
Proposition 187 Supporter	1.062	.016	.0000			
Proposition 187 Opponent				1.093	.021	.0000
Constant	-2.293	.020	.0000	-2.222	.022	.0000
Overall Models:	Chi-Sq=13059, 3 df p<.0001 N=228,396 89.2% correctly classified			Chi-Sq=7134, 3 df p<.0001 N=228,396 95.3% correctly classified		

Note: Coefficients are from the logistic regression procedure in SPSS.
 Dependent variable coded 1 if split ticket in given manner and 0 if did not. Ballots from the two uncontested Congressional districts are excluded from analysis.
 Partisan strength is measure of loyalty to a single party in all races except Governor, Assembly, and Congress. Partisan strength ranges from 0 (weakest) to 8 (strongest).

I transformed these coefficients into actual probability estimates, holding other variables in the model constant. Table 13 details all of these probability estimates and allows for a more direct comparison to gubernatorial/assembly voting.

Holding partisan strength and Proposition 187 support constant at their means, a person living in a Democrat incumbent district has a .11 probability of casting a RD ballot; the same person living in a Republican district has less than a .06 probability of doing so. The overall effect of Democratic incumbency, therefore, is to increase the probability of RD voting by .054. This is almost identical to the .045 net influence of

incumbency in gubernatorial/assembly ticket splitting. Looking at the impact of Proposition 187, a person who supported the ballot measure (holding all else equal) had a .134 probability of casting a RD ballot. A proposition 187 opponent with the same characteristics had only a .05 probability of doing so. The net effect of Proposition 187 support, therefore, is to increase the probability of RD ticket splitting by more than .08; again, nearly identical to its influence in gubernatorial/assembly ticket splitting. As was true on the assembly side, short term forces in the gubernatorial race seem to have been more important drivers of RD ticket splitting than were short term forces in congressional races.

Table 13 Computed Impacts: 1994 L.A. County U.S. Congress Ticket Splitting			
Wilson Splitters (RD)		Brown Splitters (DR)	
Probability Given:		Probability Given:	
Democrat incumbent	.1132	Democrat incumbent	.0255
Republican incumbent	.0596	Republican incumbent	.0550
Proposition 187 Supporter	.1339	Proposition 187 Supporter	.0226
Proposition 187 Opponent	.0508	Proposition 187 Opponent	.0646
No partisan strength	.2126	No partisan strength	.0971
Strongest partisan	.0536	Strongest partisan	.0209
Impact of:		Impact of:	
Proposition 187 support	.0831	Proposition 187 opposition	.0420
Democrat incumbency	.0536	Republican incumbency	.0295
One partisan strength unit	.0199	One partisan strength unit	.0095

Proposition 187 opposition and Republican incumbency play a nearly equal role in driving DR gubernatorial/congressional voting, as was the case on the assembly side. Both factors increase the probability of splitting one’s ticket in this direction, but the two effects are about equal — and considerably weaker than in predicting RD ticket splitting. This is, again, consistent with the issue ownership theory. Because Proposition 187 featured a popular Republican-owned issue and dominated the gubernatorial race, it drew toward Pete Wilson many of those who had supported Democrats for congress (and assembly). Issue ownership-driven ticket splitting was an important component of Wilson’s victory.

Partisan strength (or lack thereof) is again much more strongly associated with both kinds of gubernatorial/congressional ticket splitting than either of the other two factors — but about the same as was true for gubernatorial/assembly voting.

Conclusions

This paper has investigated and tested Petrocik's theory of ticket splitting as driven by short term forces at both the top and bottom of the ballot. The analysis confirms that legislative incumbency was a substantial driver of split ticket voting in 1994, *but also finds that the issues central to the gubernatorial race were no less important (and were sometimes even more important) drivers of ticket splitting.* Among those siding with the Democrat for state assembly, those agreeing with the Republican candidate on the gubernatorial election's defining issue were much more likely to defect to the Republican gubernatorial candidate than were those agreeing with the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Cross-pressured voters were most likely of all to split their ballots. This is consistent with Petrocik's theory that issue ownership can be responsible for ticket splitting and, ultimately, divided government.

The ballots provide only an indirect examination of the "balancing" thesis, but because the same short term forces seem to exert the same degree of influence both when voters *could* conceivably be "choosing divided government" and when they *could not possibly* be doing so, this seems to point up the importance of short term forces as opposed to a conscious desire for divided government *per se*.

This research also demonstrates the value of analyzing actual ballot punch cards. The wealth of information available in ballot punch cards has gone largely untapped, in part because of inaccessibility and lack of demographic data. This paper provides suggestions for overcoming these hurdles, and demonstrates that election ballots can add an important perspective to our understanding of voting behavior. Although the ballots do have substantial shortcomings, investigating actual "tickets" provides an important additional understanding of "ticket splitting."

Appendix

The 1994 ballots are stored on 22 magnetic round-reel tapes. The county registrar’s office⁸ reads ballots onto these reels one precinct at a time; each reel contains roughly 400 precincts. According to the director of operations, there is no bias whatever to the order in which precincts are read — or which precincts’ ballots end up on which reels. On election night, ballot boxes are stacked haphazardly around a large room, opened in random order, and the punch cards are fed into card readers (which write to the magnetic tape reels).

I used two complete reels: Reel #4 and Reel #14. I selected the reels I did because (1) neither contained any absentee ballots (I wanted all ballots to have been cast using the same method); and (2) these reels contained the largest number of ballots. After compiling all 861 precincts, I confirmed that they were indeed drawn from all over the County (discussed earlier) and closely matched the County’s overall racial profile.

	Sample Precincts	Los Angeles County
Non-Latino White	46.3%	45.6%
Latino	32.4	33.3
Non-Latino Black	10.4	10.8
Non-Latino Asian	10.4	10.8

Furthermore, as Table A2 demonstrates, the ballots used in this analysis are highly representative of those cast throughout the County.

Office	Ballots in Sample			Official L.A. County Results		
	GOP	Dem	Other	GOP	Dem	Other
Governor	49.8%	46.4	3.8	50.4%	46.1	3.5
Lieutenant Governor	34.7%	58.1	7.2	35.3%	58.1	6.6
Secretary of State	38.7%	50.3	11	39.1%	50.8	10.1
Controller	38.1%	55.9	6	39.2%	55.1	5.7
Treasurer	42.9%	47.2	9.9	44%	46.9	9.1
Attorney General	47.3%	45.9	6.8	48.4%	45.3	6.3
Insurance Commissioner	42.3%	50.7	7	43%	50.2	6.8

References

- Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal (1995). *Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Beck, Paul Allen, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith, Jr. (1992). "Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting." *American Political Science Review* 86 (December):916-928.
- Burden, Barry C. and David C. Kimball (1998). "A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting." *American Political Science Review* 92 (September):533-544.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (1960). *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Campbell, Angus and Warren E. Miller (1957). "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting." *American Political Science Review* 51 (June):293-312.
- Fiorina, Morris P. (1996) *Divided Government*. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Field, Mervin. (1994). Statewide survey of 1023 registered voters, conducted October 21-30, 1994. Results as reported in the *Hotline*.
- Ingberman, Daniel, and John Villani (1993). "An Institutional Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (May): 429-471.
- Jacobson, Gary C. (1997). *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. 4th ed. New York: Longman.
- Key Jr., V.O. (1956). *American State Politics: An Introduction*. New York: Knopf.
- Mebane Jr., Walter R. (2000). "Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections." *American Political Science Review* 94 (March):37-58.
- Petrocik, John R. (1991). "Divided Government: Is it all in the Campaigns?" In *The Politics of Divided Government*, ed. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Westview Press.
- Petrocik, John R. and Joseph Doherty (1996) "The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention." In *Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order*, ed. Peter F. Galderisi. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Smith, Charles E., Jr. (1999). "Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election." *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (July): 737-764.

Endnotes

¹ Without the assistance of Peter Saama, a university consultant, none of this data translation would have been possible. Many thanks also to Gretchen Kalsow (University of Virginia) and Gayle Willis, analyst with the LA County Recorder's Office, for their help in understanding these data formats. Any errors remain my own.

² Complicating matters, however, names in all partisan contests are rotated by assembly district; Kathleen Brown might correspond to punch #1 in some precincts but punch #4 in others. In addition, varying numbers of local races (with varying numbers of candidates) also made the precise ballot layout vary from precinct to precinct. All told, there are hundreds of versions of the ballot across Los Angeles County, and building a final data file from these ballots was an enormous undertaking.

³ Races on the ballot, in ballot order: Governor, Lt. Governor, Secretary of State, Controller, Treasurer, Attorney General, Insurance Commissioner, State Board of Equalization, U.S. Senator, U.S. Congress, and State Assembly. State Senate was excluded because only half of the voters had a State Senate election.

⁴ Wilson's personal impression rating was 49 percent favorable and 46 percent unfavorable.

⁵ Brown's personal impression rating was 40 percent favorable and 44 percent unfavorable.

⁶ The two uncontested assembly districts, AD 48 and AD 55, which incidentally both featured Democratic incumbents, are excluded from all of this analysis.

⁷ The two uncontested congressional districts, CD 33 and CD 37, which incidentally both featured Democratic incumbents, are excluded from all of this analysis.

⁸ The Los Angeles County Registrar's office can be contacted at 562/462-2748. It is located at 12400 Imperial Hwy., Norwalk, CA 90651.